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Abstract 
In this paper, I study the valuation effects of cross listing in the U.S. for a panel of emerging market firms over the 
period from 1990 to 2003.  In line with Kristian-Hope et al. (2007), I find that only those firms from high disclosure 
regimes gain from Level 2/3 listing in the U.S.  The gains are not immediate, but materialize once the firm has listed in 
the U.S. for at least five years.  I also document long-term, but not immediate valuation gains for Level 1 over-the-
counter issues.  In contrast to Level 2/3 issues, the gains are concentrated amongst firms from low-disclosure regimes.  
I find no positive valuation effects for Rule 144a private placements.  The results suggest that the decision on the part 
of the majority of firms from low-disclosure regimes not to list as exchange traded depositary receipts is warranted.                     
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 Up to recently, the prevailing wisdom decreed that the greatest gains to exchange-cross-listing in the U.S. 
should accrue to those firms domiciled in countries where investors are poorly protected.  Grounded in what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘legal finance’ literature, an exchange-cross-listing in the U.S. provides a remedy for 
firms to overcome their financing constraints at home, and thus facilitate their hitherto stagnated growth (See La 
Porta et al., 1998 and Demerguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 for the legal finance view, and Coffee, 1999, 2002 and 
Lins et al., 2005 for arguments specific to cross-listing).  Although this option is not cheap, and is greatest for 
emerging market firms (i.e. cost of U.S. G.A.A.P. compliance), the belief was that the potential benefits from listing, 
would be more than sufficient to meet these additional on-going costs.  In fact, in their theoretical model, Doidge et 
al. (2004), using valuation metrics theorize that the greatest valuation gains to listing, what they refer to as a ‘cross 
listing premium’, should accrue to firms domiciled in emerging markets.  Bris and Brisley (2006) reach similar 
theoretical conclusions.  In support, using standard event study analysis, Miller (1999) and Serra (1999) find 
empirical findings in favour of this view.   However, this view has been recently challenged.   
  First, in contrast to Doidge et al. (2004), Kristian-Hope et al. (2007), also using valuation metrics conclude 
that exchange-traded firms from low-disclosure regimes receive a lower valuation than their counterpart high-
disclosure domiciled firms.  They theorize that the benefits from listing may not be sufficient to meet the sizable 
costs (or large enough to ensure that low disclosure regime firms gain most).  As a result, exchange-traded firms 
from high disclosure regimes gain most from listing1.  Second, and consistent with this view, the number of firms 
that have de-listed from depositary receipt programs has intensified in the last few years (See Witmer (2006) and 
Marosi and Massoud (2006)).  In many instances, firms have cited the costs associated with SEC compliance as the 
primary reason for delisting, which have intensified since the imposition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 20022.  Taken 
together, both suggest that the benefits from listing may not be sufficient to meet the costs of listing for emerging 
market firms.  This suggests that the valuation gains, documented by Miller (1999) and Serra (1999) may be short-
lived.   
 In this paper, I examine the valuation effects of listing in the U.S. for a sample of 583 cross-listed emerging 
market firms.  Like Doidge et al. (2004) and Kristian-Hope et al. (2007), I use valuation metrics, namely Tobin’s q.  
However, unlike them, I abstract from their cross-sectional approach and examine the valuation effects of listing 
within a panel setting.  This approach allows me to examine the valuation effects in calendar (as Doidge et al., 2004 
and Kristian-Hope et al., 2007 do), but also in event time.  The benefit of the later is that it allows me to examine 
the effects of listing on firm value in the short and long run3.  The primary drawback with the cross-sectional 
                                                 
1 Firms from high-disclosure regimes have also cited the costs of SEC complinace as their primary reason for delisting.  For example, 
Skyepharma, a U.K. firm delisted from the Nasdaq in 2007 due to the “expense and burden associated with maintaining compliance with SEC 
and Nasdaq rules”.  Healthcare Finance, Tax & Law Weekly.    
2  The greater costs of listing post-Sarbanes-Oxley are not the only reasons for voluntary firm delistings.  Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007) show 
that a sizable proportion of those that voluntarily cross-delist are low quality firms i.e. firms with low average profitability, assets, and market 
capitalization, poor stock price performance (50% decline since listing), and no analyst coverage (60%).  In connection, Hostak et al. (2006) show 
that those firms that voluntarily cross-delist have weaker corporate governance systems.            
3 I could, of course have examined the long-term valuation effects of listing using the event-study approach of Miller (1999) and Serra (1999).  
However, this approach has two major drawbacks.  First, Kothari and Warner (2005) highlight the limitations of long-horizon event study 
methods.   Second, event studies may not adequately control for self-selection bias.  These concerns are voiced by Heidle (2003) and Mittoo 
(2003).  In his synopsis of Mittoo (2003), Heidle (2003, pg. 1664) concludes, “As with all event studies, the analysis in this paper suffers from a 
potential self-selection bias”.  In fact Mittoo (2003, pg. 1659) explicitly acknowledges this shortcoming in her conclusion, “…long-term 
performance is generally difficult to measure and our results should be interpreted with some caution because of several limitations of our 
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approach of Doidge et al. (2004) and Kristian-Hope et al. (2007) is that the effect of listing is estimated using a 
cross-sectional of firms with varying degrees of exposure to listing.  Thus, in effect, the cross-sectional estimate 
assumes that gains from listing are homogenous in each post-listing event year.  However, there is ample evidence 
to suggest that this is not the case.   
 Using a series of pooled ordinary least squares and treatment effect regressions, I find support in favour of 
the predictions of Kristian-Hope et al. (2007).  For emerging market Level 2/3 issues, the valuation gains accrue 
only to firms from countries where investors are well protected.  However, the gains are not immediate.  I find that 
the gains to listing materialize, once the firm has listed in the U.S. for at least five years.  I also document long-term, 
but not immediate valuation gains for Level 1 over-the-counter issues.  In contrast to Level 2/3 issues, the gains are 
concentrated amongst firms from low-disclosure regimes.  I find no positive valuation effects for Rule 144a private 
placements.                   
 The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, I outline the sample of emerging market firms.  In 
Section 3, I present univariate statistics and proceed to outline and discuss the regression analysis employed (pooled 
ordinary least squares and treatment effects).  Section 4 concludes.          
      
2. Data 
 I begin by sourcing a full list of emerging market countries with firms cross-listed in the United States.  
From each, I identify those firms with a cross listing in the U.S.  All information on cross-listed firms is sourced 
from the Bank of New York, and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, the New 
York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq.  From my cross-listed sample of firms, I classify firms according to their first 
cross listing, and classify simultaneous Level 1/Portal ‘listings’ as Level 1 issues.  My final sample (Table 1) is 
comprised of 4,563 non-cross-listed, non-financial firms and 583 cross-listed firms.  The cross-listed sample is 
comprised of 260 Level 1 firms, 142 exchange-listed Level 2/3 issues and 181 firms that trade under Rule144a.  I 
supplement my original sample of 4,563 non-cross-listed non-financial firms, with an additional 1,031 financial firms 
to ensure appropriate matches for our financial cross-listed firms.  I do not include these financial firms in my fixed-
effects, pooled ordinary least squares, and treatment-effects models since the valuation ratios for financial firms are 
not comparable to those for non-financial firms.  Thus, the elimination of financial firms facilitates a greater 
comparison of firms across countries.  Finally, I only include firms with average total assets greater than 100 million 
U.S. dollars.  This latter approach facilitates a greater comparison between cross-listed and non cross-listed firms.   
 In Table 1 I outline by country the number of non-cross-listed firms, and the number of cross-listed firms 
listed in the United States by depositary receipt level.  I provide the percentage that each country (i.e. number of 
firms) contributes to the total number of firms in each depositary receipt level and adopt an identical approach for 
my non-cross-listed sample.  Taken together South Korean and Malaysian firms comprise almost 28% of the non-
cross-listed sample: Colombian firms contribute just over half of 1%.  Hong Kong firms provide the greatest 
number of Level 1 firms (37.31%), while Argentina provides no firm.  Brazil and Mexico equally provide the 
greatest share of exchange Level 2/3 issues, while India and Taiwan supply the majority of firms that trade in the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
methodology.  First, benchmarking performance with market indexes as done in our study could lead to serious biases and measurement 
problems”.  I seek to control for self-selection bias using firm-fixed effects and treatment effects regressions.  They are outlined later in the text.     
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U.S. under Rule 144a on the Portal.  An interesting feature evident from Table 1 is that across and within countries 
there exists significantly differing preferences for the different types of depositary receipt listings.  For example, the 
majority of firms from Hong Kong trade over-the-counter as Level 1 issues.  This contrasts notably with the 
preference of Indian and Taiwanese firms for a Rule 144a issue.  Israeli firms that are predominantly high-tech firms 
reveal a strong preference for exchange-listed (Nasdaq) depositary receipts.  Although now seen as developed 
nations, I include Hong King and Singapore, as they were deemed ‘emerging’ during a sizable portion of the sample 
period.     
 I follow Doidge et al. (2004, 2006, 2007), and Kristian-Hope et al. (2007) and employ Tobin’s q to measure 
firm value, where Tobin’s q is defined book value of debt + market capitalization
book value of assets
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  where book value of debt is 
calculated as book value total assets less the book value of equity.  All variables are expressed in local currency, 
sourced from Worldscope and are collected on the 31st of December in each year from 1990 to 2003. 
 I employ the following firm-level control variables in my empirical specifications: I use the average sales 
growth over the last two years (geometric average) and Global Industry q to account for firm and industry growth, 
respectively.  Based upon primary standard industry classifications, the (yearly) mean Global Industry q is calculated 
as the average q of all global firms within each classification.  I employ over 15,000 international firms from the 
Worldscope database to calculate the mean Global Industry q for each year.  I use the log of total assets ($) to 
control for firm size.  To remove the influence of outliers, I remove the top 1% of observations for Tobin’s q, and 
two-year average sales growth, and total assets.   
 I include La Porta et al. (1998) country-level governance variables in order to examine the valuation effects 
of listing across different governance regimes.  I employ legal origin (English Common, French, Scandinavian and 
German Civil Law), anti-director rights index, an equally weighted index of 6 different shareholder rights, which 
ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 5, and judicial efficiency, which ranges from 0 to 10.  A higher rating implies 
greater judicial efficiency.  The country-level governance variables are outlined by country in Appendix 2.  In 
Appendix 3, I present correlation coefficient estimates for all firm and country variables employed in the analysis.  
By and large, the correlation coefficients are of the correct sign, and statistically different from zero.  Tobin’s q is 
increasing in Global q, and anti-director rights.  Larger firms are worth less.  In the remaining column, I present 
variance inflation factors.  Multicollinearity is of no concern in this study.                  
 
3.  Empirical results 
 In this section, I outline the main results on cross-listing and firm value.  I begin with univariate 
comparisons, whereby I compare the value of cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event time.  I 
then proceed to panel regression estimates. 
 
 
 
3.1 Year-by-year valuation comparisons 
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 In Table 2 (Panel A) I compare the value of cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in each year from 
1990 to 2003.  For each subset of cross-listed firms, I outline the value of the mean and median firm in each year.  
In the remaining columns, I calculate the mean valuation difference [Mean Diff] between the average cross-listed 
firm, and non-cross-listed firm.  Numbers in bold signify that the mean difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  To complement these numbers, I present in Figures 1-3, the mean and median value of cross-
listed firms, and the mean value of non-cross-listed firms.  The mean difference is calculated using only large firms 
i.e. firms with average total assets greater than one hundred million U.S. dollars.  This facilitates a greater 
comparison between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms.  The median valuation differentials are available from 
the author upon request.   
 In the final column, I outline the Average Effect of the Treatment on the Treated [ATT] using propensity 
score matching.  The ATT, calculated as CL NCLE(q q |D 1, X)− = , is the difference in value between each cross-
listed firm, and a matched sample of non-cross-listed firms, with an almost identical probability of listing i.e. 
propensity score.  Cross-listed firms are matched to non-cross-listed firms based upon size (total assets), growth 
(two-year sales growth), legal origin, and industry group using propensity score matching.  Li and Zhao (2006) adopt 
an identical approach in their study of seasoned equity offerings.  In Appendix 1, I outline in greater detail the 
calculation of the estimated propensity scores and the ATT estimates.   
 The summary measures presented in Table 2 (Panel A) are somewhat consistent with the findings of 
Doidge et al. (2006, 2007).  Specifically, the matching estimates suggest that exchange traded firms experience the 
largest cross-listing premia.  Next I find that the cross-listing premium tends to vary over time.  For example, 
emerging market Level 2/3 firms are worth more, but not statistically so in every period.  The cross-listing premium 
is greatest for these firms in 1994.  In contrast, for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, the valuation difference tends to 
vary from discount to premium over time.  
   
3.2 Event time valuation comparisons 
 I compare in Table 2 (Panel B), the value of cross-listed firms to non-cross-listed firms in event time.  I 
denote the list year as ‘0’, and compare cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms for the five years before to five years after 
listing.  I outline the mean value of cross-listed firms, and calculate the mean difference [Mean Diff] between both sets 
of firms.  The (unreported) median differentials are similar, and are available from the author upon request.  In the 
final column, I calculate the ATT in event time ( CL NCLE(q q |D 1, X)− = ).  Specifically, in the year preceding the list 
year, I match cross-listed to non-cross-listed firms based upon size (total assets), growth (two-year sales growth), legal 
origin, and industry group.  I also include time dummies to ensure that the matches are generated prior to listing.  For 
each group of firms, I outline the ATT for each year (including the list year) up to five years post-listing.  In Appendix 
1a, I outline the corresponding first-stage probit estimates4.  The column labeled ‘Matches’ refers to the number of 
cross-listed to non-cross-listed matches.  In Appendix 1b, I present alternative probit specifications.  The ATT 
                                                 
4 In their study, Li and Zhao (2006, pg. 358) estimate separate propensity score models for each year.  I carry out a similar exercise in Table 2 
(Panel A).  They refrain from estimating a pooled propensity score model over the entire period because of the year-by-year analysis provides a 
“flexible specification for business cycle”.  Although I am aware of the limitations of the pooled specification to adequately account for business 
cycle effects, I am primarily motivated in this paper to examine the valuation effects in event time, and not in calendar time.     
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estimates are similar, irrespective of the probit specification employed.  Finally, I also present in Figures 1-3, the time 
series behaviour of Tobin’s for the average and median cross-listed firm, from ten years prior to listing to ten years 
after listing.        
 Panel B suggests the following.  First, Level 1 firms list after a period of poor performance (i.e. falling 
value).  The absolute and relative value of Level 1 firms, falls in the pre-listing period, and continues to fall post-
listing.  The greatest fall-off in value occurs in the pre-listing period.  For example, in the five-year period 
immediately prior to listing, the average Level 1 firm loses just less than 25% of its value.  After listing in the U.S., 
value continues to fall, but at a much reduced pace.  Specifically, after five years of listing, average value falls by 
14.53%.  The evidence from Figure 1 suggests that after five years of listing, mean and median value tends to level 
off.  The fall in absolute value over this period results in Level 1 firms losing their valuation premium over non-
cross-listed firms.  The average Level 1 firm is worth more than domestic firms pre-listing, but on a par with these 
firms, post-listing.          
 In contrast to Level 1 firms, firms that trade under Rule 144a appear to ‘time’ their decision to list in the 
U.S; for the average (and unreported median) firm, value increases dramatically in the years prior to listing, followed 
by a corresponding fall off thereafter.  This trend is depicted graphically in Figure 3.  In essence, these firms take 
advantage of favourable market conditions, and thus raise equity, via private placements during boom markets.   
 Finally, the univariate summary measures for Level 2/3 firms highlight that Level 2/3 firms are not worth 
more than non-cross-listed firms in every year up to five years post-listing.  This is in contrast to the calendar year 
cross listing premia from Panel A.  Thus, the question remains; are the results reconcilable with one another?  I 
believe so.  From Panel A, I find that the cross listing premia manifest in the later half of the sample period, with 
the exception of 1994.  In the later years of the sample, the majority of the sample of Level 2/3 firms has been listed 
in the U.S. for five years or more.  The calendar year cross listing premia may therefore be a result of long-term 
valuation gains from listing, which have yet to materialize after five years of listing.  I return to this in the next 
section.             
  
3.3 Regression analysis 
 In this section I examine the effect of cross listing on firm value.  I begin with the following specification, 
whereby I model firm value as a function of firm characteristics: 
                             (1)   it it 1 it 2 it 3 it itq X Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a u= α + β+ δ + δ + δ +
Where  is a set of exogenous observable characteristics of the firm, itX itLevel 1 , , itLevel 2/3 itRule 144a are 
standard dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the firm trades in the United States as a Level 1, Level 2/3, or 
under Rule 144a on Portal, respectively.   is a standard idiosyncratic disturbance term, and  is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated.   
itu 1 2 3{ , , , , }α β δ δ δ
 I explicitly acknowledge the non-randomness of the cross-listed sample, and model their decision to cross 
list as follows:         
 7
                                                                        
*
it it it
*
it it
*
it it
CL Z
CL 1 if CL 0
CL 0 if CL 0
= γ +η
= >
= <
                       (2) 
Where  (*itCL it it it itLevel 1 , Level 2/3 , Rule 144a CL∈ ) is an unobserved latent variable,  is a set of observable 
firm-level characteristics that determine the decision to cross-list in the United States, and  is a disturbance term.  
Selection bias arises because of the correlation between 
itZ
itη
it it itLevel 1 , Level 2/3 , Rule 144a it and u .  This correlation 
can arise in two instances i.e. (1) selection on observables5 which arises through correlation between itZ  and itu , or 
(2) through selection on unobservables i.e. correlation between itη  and itu .  Both instances render ordinary least 
squares estimates of the effect of cross listing on value, biased.  
 In my analysis, I estimate the effect of listing on firm value using two approaches.  First, I estimate firm-
fixed effect regressions.  In this specification, I assume that the unobservables are time-invariant.  Thus, the 
inclusion of firm-fixed effects is sufficient to adequately model, and thus control for unobservables.  Unlike 
matching estimates, I do not assume away unobservables; I just assume that I can adequately control for them.  
Second, I must assume that the unobservables, in addition to being time-invariant, have no causal effect in 
precipitating cross listing (See Li and Prabhala (2005) for a discussion).   
 Next, I explicitly model for unobservables by proxying for them.  To do so I estimate a treatment effects 
model, whereby I augment the second stage equation with a selection correction term namely the inverse mills ratio, 
from a first-stage probit model.  The inverse mills ratios are generated on a year-by-year basis (using yearly probit 
models), thus resulting in a series of time-variant unobservables in the second stage equation.  Next, I outline both 
methods in greater detail.       
 
Firm-fixed effects. 
 I begin with a standard fixed-effects specification.  I augment Eq. (1) with time-fixed effects and estimate 
the following two-way fixed effects model6: 
     it i it 1 it 2 it 3 it t itq X Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a= α +β + δ + δ + δ +α + υ       (3) 
tα  are time-fixed effects that account for contemporaneous correlation, and iα are firm specific fixed effects, which 
reflect differences across firms that are constant, but unobserved over time.  
 Next, I estimate a pooled version given my concerns over violations of strict exogeneity7.  I specify the 
individual specific effects as Mundlak (1978) corrections: 
T
i i i i
s 1
1X a , where X X
T =
α = ζ + = ∑ it
                                                
.  Substituting into Eq. 
(3) yields the following: 
 
5 If I assume selection on observables, I must assume that unobservables (private information) do not influence the decision to list and/or 
influence post-listing value.  The significance of the ‘inverse-mills ratio’ in later tables suggests that this is not the case.  However, in Table 2 I 
outline the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) for cross-listed firms, in calendar and event time.  The ATT is the difference in 
value between the cross-listed and matched non-cross-listed firm.  These propensity score matching estimates assume that the decision to cross-
list is a function of observable factors only.    
6 The results from both the standard Hausman (1978) test, and Mundlak (1978) auxiliary regression specification confirm that in this instance a 
random effects specification is not appropriate.     
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               it it 1 it 2 it 3 it i itq X Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a X= α + β+ δ + δ + δ + ζ +μ                    (4)     
  
Treatment Effects 
 In this section I outline a standard treatment effects model, whereby I correct for the probability of listing 
based upon unobservable factors.  This approach is similar, but not identical to the standard Heckman (1979) two-
stage estimation procedure8.  I begin by referring to Eq. (2).  Now I assume that the decision to cross-list in the 
United States is a function of unobservable characteristics.  Campa and Kedia (2002), Colak and Whited (2005), and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) estimate similar ‘pooled Heckman’ models.  Thus, the impact on firm value conditional 
on being cross-listed in the United States as: 
                              (5) it it it 1 1 it it itE(q |CL 1) X CL E( |CL 1)= = α + β + δ + υ =
Given Eq. (2) and assuming that the errors terms from both Eq. (1) and (2) are bivariate normal, the unobservable 
component from Eq. (2), the generalized residual from the probit model is defined as: 
     it it 1 itE(q |C 1) ( Z )υ= = ρσ λ β                       (6) 
Where:    
     it1 it
it
( Z )( Z )
( Z )
ϕ βλ β = φ β             (7) 
The latter is commonly referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio, and is a series of time-specific ‘inverse mills ratios’.    
In the second-stage, I add this selection-correction term, yielding the following: 
                          (8) it it 1 1 it 1 2 i itq X C c= α + β + δ + λ β + + υ
In addition, I specify the unobserved heterogeneity as in Mundlak (1978) i.e. 
T
i i i i
s 1
1c X a , where X X
T =
= ζ + = it∑ , 
and estimate the following: 
    it it 1 1 it 1 2 i itq X C X= α + β + δ + λ β + δ + υ                       (9) 
 
In their pooled ‘Heckman’ specification, Dewenter et al. (2005) control for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating 
least squared dummy variable model, whereby, as the name suggests they include a dummy-variable for each firm9.  
Given the disadvantage of using this approach in large samples, I specify the unobserved heterogeneity by including 
Mundlak (1978) correction terms as an additional set of regressors in Eq. (9).  I estimate treatment effects models 
for each set of cross-listed firms separately.     
 The coefficient estimates for Eqs. (3, 4, 9) are presented in Table 3 and suggest the following.  First, and in 
line with Doidge et al. (2004, 2006, 2007) I find a statistically significant cross listing premium for Level 2/3 issues.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
7 I formally test for this possibility, following Wooldridge (2002), by inserting the one-year forwarded cross-listing variables as independent 
variables and testing whether their coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
8 Technically, the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure is not a treatment effects model.  In addition to the standard Heckman (1979) model, a 
treatment effects model includes, unlike the Heckman (1979) model, the selection indicator from the first stage probit as a regressor in the second-
stage regression.   
9 I would like to thank Kathryn Dewenter and Walter Novaes for clarifying to me their estimation procedure.   
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Although the coefficient estimate is (marginally) statistically insignificant in the treatment effects model, the 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant in both the firm-fixed effects and pooled ordinary least squares 
regressions.  The cross listing premium ranges from 0.15 to 0.24, which are similar in magnitude to those reported 
by Doidge et al. (2007, 0.08 to 0.25).  In the treatment effects model, the coefficient on the inverse mills ratio is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that those unobservable factors to determine the decision to cross 
list, also impact positively on post-listing firm value.  In all three specifications, the control variables are of the 
correct sign, and statistically different from zero.  Corporate value is increasing in firm and industry growth, and 
decreasing in firm size.  In line with La Porta et al. (2002), firms are worth more in high-disclosure regimes.  For 
both sub-sets of non-exchange traded depositary receipts, I find no cross listing premium.  The coefficient estimates 
from all three estimators suggest that trading in the U.S. does not enhance the value of Level 1, nor Rule 144a firms.   
 The results thus far suggest that cross listing enhances value for Level 2/3 firms only.  Two questions 
remain.  First, does cross listing affect firms from different regimes differently?  Doidge et al. (2004) hypothesis that 
the gains to listing increase with the level of domestic investor protection.  Kristian-Hope et al. (2007) find evidence 
that suggests otherwise.  I re-examine this issue in Table 4.  Second, I examine whether the cross listing premium 
documented for Level 2/3 firms in Table 2 is permanent?  Sarkissian and Schill (2007) conclude that the gains to 
international cross listing are transitory.  I return to this issue in Table 5.   
 In Table 4, I examine whether the gains to listing are uniformly distributed across legal regimes.  I estimate 
pooled ordinary least squares (with Mundlak (1978) corrections) based upon country legal characteristics.  I employ 
three legal characteristics, namely anti-director rights index, judicial efficiency, and legal origin.  All variables are 
sourced from La Porta et al. (1998) and are defined earlier.  I estimate models for subsets of firms classified in terms of 
being above or below the median value of each index.  The median values are calculated based upon the number of 
countries in the sample.    In terms of legal origin, I classify firms as either English common law or French/German 
civil law. 
 The results from Table 4 are in line with Kristian-Hope et al. (2007).  I find that the cross listing premium 
documented for Level 2/3 firms is specific to firms from high-disclosure regimes.  For all three country legal 
characteristic measures, the Level 2/3-coefficient estimate for ‘above-median’ firms is large and statistically different 
from zero, and is largest for English common law firms.  The corresponding coefficient estimates for ‘below-median’, 
with the exception of French/German civil law firms, are positive, but statistically insignificant.  French/German civil 
laws are worth more after listing, but less than English common law firms.  Similar valuation differentials manifest 
when I classify firms according to anti-director rights or judicial efficiency.  For Level 2/3 firms, the results suggest that 
the cross listing premium is increasing in the domestic level of investor protection. 
 The results for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms suggest the opposite.  In two of the three cases, ‘below-median’ 
Level 1 firms are worth more after listing in the U.S., and more than ‘above-median’ firms.  For example, the ‘below-
median’ Level 1 firm based on judicial efficiency is endowed with a cross listing premium of 0.26, compared to an 
insignificant listing discount for the ‘above-median’ firm.  ‘Below-median’ Rule 144a firms also experience enhanced 
value after listing.  Using all three legal measures, they are worth significantly more, and, like Level 1 firms, are worth 
more than ‘above-median’ firms.  These results are worthy of further attention.  Doidge et al. (2004) present a 
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theoretical model where the cross listing premium is increasing in both growth opportunities, and the ‘host’ level of 
investor protection10.  Given that growth opportunities are expected to be higher for listed firms from countries with 
low investor protection, a higher cross listing premium is expected for these firms.  In order to examine this, I add the 
additional interaction variables of Level 1 and sales growth and anti-director rights, and Rule 144a and sales growth and 
anti-director rights.  A priori, I would expect a negative coefficient estimate for both variables.  The coefficient 
estimates are outlined in the last column of Table 4.  The coefficient estimate for ‘Level 1 * Sales Growth * Anti’ is 
negative and statistically different from zero.  Thus, the cross listing premium documented for Level 1 firms from 
countries with weak investor protection is caused by sizable growth opportunities.  What remains interesting is that a 
Level 1 listing, as opposed to a Level 2/3 exchange listing, is sufficient for firms to exercise their growth opportunities.  
The corresponding coefficient estimate for Rule 144a firms is contrary to what I expected; it is positive, albeit 
indifferent to zero.   
 The results thus far suggest the following.  Level 2/3 firms from strong investor protection countries are 
worth more after listing in the U.S.  Like Kristian-Hope et al. (2007), the cross listing premium for these firms is 
increasing in the level of domestic investor protection.  In contrast, Level 1 and Rule 144a firms from countries with 
weak investor protection are the only firms to reap enhanced value from listing.  At least in the case of Level 1 firms, 
the results from Table 4 suggest that the cross listing premium is a result of sizable growth opportunities.  This result is 
interesting.  It suggests that Level 1 and Rule 144a firms from countries with weak investor protection would do better 
in refraining from listing on organised U.S. exchanges.  Level 1 and Rule 144a depositary receipt programs are a 
sufficient, and less costly means to fund their growth opportunities.   
  Finally, I examine whether the aforementioned cross listing premia are permanent.  The dummy variable 
constructs in Tables 3 and 4 do not allow me to answer this question.  To answer this question, I do the following.  
I create a series of individual event-year post-listing dummy variables.  Specifically, I create 7 individual event-year 
dummies; one for each post-listing year (including the List year) up to five years post-listing, and a final dummy (> 5 
years after listing), which is designed to measure, any potential long-term valuation gains to listing.  These single year 
event-year specific dummies are 1 on the referred year and zero otherwise.  The reference year is the pre-listing 
period.  I present results for the full sample of firms, and by legal origin11.  Table 5 contains the results.   
 First, the results for the full sample of firms are consistent with the propensity score matching estimates 
presented in Panel B of Table 2.  With the exception of Rule 144a firms, Level 1 and Level 2/3 firms are not worth 
more than non-cross-listed firms in each year up to five years post-listing.  The initial listing premia for Rule 144a 
firms are, it appears a result of managerial opportunism; these firms time their decision to list in the U.S.  However 
from Table 2, I cannot decipher whether there are any long-term permanent valuation gains to listing.  The inclusion 
of the ‘> 5 years after list’ dummy allows me to examine this issue.  First, in line with Doidge et al. (2007), I find that 
Level 1 firms experience a long term cross listing premium.  The coefficient on the ‘> 5 years after list’ dummy is 
positive, and statistically different from zero.  It appears French/German civil law firms account for this.  In 
                                                 
10 The cross-listing premium outlined by Doidge et al. (2004) is given by U.S.
1 kz [ (p)C (p )(C z)]
k(1 k)
+φ = + ν − ν +− .  It is increasing in growth 
opportunities z, and ‘host’ investor protection .  Z is expected to be higher for firms from weak investor protection countries.     U.S.p
11 I replicate the analysis using anti-director rights and judicial efficiency.  The results are presented in Appendix 4.     
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contrast, the cross listing premium for civil law domiciled Rule 144a firms is not permanent.  The coefficient on the 
‘> 5 years after list’ dummy is positive, but statistically indifferent (marginally) from zero.  English common law 
Rule 144a firms perform worse. The coefficient on the ‘> 5 years after list’ dummy is negative, and statistically 
different from zero.  Finally, I find that the cross listing premium documented for English common law Level 2/3 
firms is permanent.  The‘> 5 years after list’ coefficient estimate of 1.09 (t=4.62) suggests that the valuation gains 
are long-term and increasing in post-listing time (the coefficient estimates on the other post-listing dummies are 
smaller).                
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 Up to recently, the long-standing view in the cross listing literature stated that the greatest benefits to 
exchange cross listing in the U.S. should accrue to firms from low-disclosure regimes.  Grounded in the legal 
finance literature, cross listing provides a remedy, albeit expensive, for firms to overcome their financial constraints, 
and find their growth (See Lins et al., 2005 and Reese and Weisbach, 2002).  However, this prediction has been 
recently challenged.  In a series of cross-sectional valuation regressions, Kristian-Hope et al. (2007) find that the 
greatest gains to exchange listings in the U.S. are experienced, not by low disclosure regime firms, but by firms 
domiciled in high disclosure countries.  This suggests that the gains to listing in the U.S. for emerging market firms 
may not materialize, or be at best, small.  The decision of many firms to cross-delist would lend some credence to 
this argument.     
 In this paper, I extend the cross-sectional approach of Kristina-Hope et al. (2007), and examine the valuation 
effects of listing in the U.S. for a panel of emerging market firms over the period from 1990 to 2003.  Using a series of 
pooled ordinary least squares and treatment effects regressions, I find that the propensity on the part of emerging 
market firms is warranted.  For Level 2/3 lists, I find that the gains to listing accrue to firms from high disclosure 
regimes, only.  For these firms, the gains do not materialize immediately, but only after a firm has listed in the U.S. for 
at least five years.  In contrast, for those low disclosure regime firms that avoid a Level 2/3 listing, a Level 1 over-the-
counter issue provides value in the long-term.  I document no positive valuation gains for Rule 144a issues.  In 
summary, the results suggest that the decision on the part of the majority of firms from low-disclosure regimes not to 
list as exchange traded depositary receipts is warranted.                     
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   Appendix 1: Estimation of Propensity Scores & Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated 
 
Here, I outline how I estimate the propensity score estimates outlined in Table 2.  I begin by outlining exactly what I 
would like to measure.  Let CL NCLq q qΔ = −  define the valuation benefits of listing for firms, where  denotes 
the value of cross-listed firms, and , and  denotes the unobservable 
counterfactual, estimated using propensity score matching.  Firm value is proxied using Tobin’s q.  The notation is 
taken from Blundell and Costa Dias (2000).     
CLq
CL (Level 1,Level  2/3,Rule 144a)∈ NCLq
 I construct the counterfactual outcome by matching cross listing and non-cross-listing firms with similar 
observable characteristics, ex-ante.   is a vector of observable firm characteristics, which includes a set of non-
mutually exclusive observable characteristics that affect both (1) program participation, and (2) impact upon the 
outcome variable . Given , I estimate the effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT), 
.  The vector of observable characteristics, are; size (log total assets (US$)), sales growth, 
legal origin, lagged firm value, and industry dummies based upon primary standard industry classification codes.   
X
CLq X
CL NCLE(q q |D 1, X)− = X
 I begin with a parsimonious probit model, whereby I match firms based on size and industry.  
Subsequently, I augment this with sales growth, legal origin, and lagged q, respectively (See Deheija (2005) for a 
discussion on the importance of adopting two (or more) different specifications of the probit model).  The ATT 
estimates from both are outlined in Appendix 1b.  The ATT estimates presented in Table 2 (Panel A & B) are 
calculated when size, growth, industry and legal origin are employed to estimate the propensity scores.  The first 
stage probit estimates are presented in Appendix 1a.       
 Firm value,  associated with cross listing in the U.S. can be written as a function of observables (  
and unobservables  
CLq T)
EU :
      CL CL Eq g (T) U= +         (A.1)   
Where  and  is a non-stochastic function.  The mean effect of cross listing on firm value for each firm 
with observable characteristics is given by: 
E(U ) 0= Eg
X
   CL NCL CL NCL CL NCLE(q q D 1, X) g (X) g (X) E(U U X,D 1)− = = − + − =          (A.2) 
And the average effect of cross listing is given by: 
    CL NCLCL
S
S
E(q q D 1, X)dF(X, D 1)
M (S)
dF(X, D 1)
− = == =∫ ∫                               (A.3) 
S  is a subset of the support of given .  Let denote the set of indices for cross-listed firms and  is as 
before.  The causal effect of cross listing on firm value for each firm
X D 1= LI CLq
i , where CLi I∈  is obtained by comparing iCLq , 
the average value of a cross-listed firm to the average value of a matched non-cross-listed firm,
jNCL
q  where NCLj I∈ .  
Each cross-listed firm is matched to its ‘nearest’ non-cross-listed firm and may be matched to more than one non-
cross-listed firm if more than one is identified.  The change in value for each firm is then given by: 
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i j
NCL
p
CL CL NCL
j I
q W (i, j)q
∈
− p∑        (A.4) 
Where CLW (i, j) is a positive weight function such that the weight sum to 1.  Aggregating across firms, the average 
effect of cross listing on value is given by: 
    
i j
CL NCL
^
p
CL CL NCL
i I j ICL
1M(CL,p,S) q W (i, j)q
N ∈ ∈
= −∑ ∑                               (A.5) 
 and  is the number of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in  and  respectively.  I 
employ ‘Nearest-Neighbour’ matching to match the listed and non-listed firms.  Nearest-neighbour matching begins by 
defining a neighbourhood for firm  where
CLN NCLN CLI NCLI
iC(X ) i CLi I∈ .  Neighbours are chosen for each firm such that for each 
non-cross-listed firm
i
NCL J i( j I , X   C(X )∈ ∈ ) . 
Appendix 1a: First-stage probit estimates for Table 2 (Panel B).  
  Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 Time Probit Matches Probit Matches Probit Matches 
Sales Growth List Year 
 
0.45 
[1.33] 
79/66 0.88 
[2.01]** 
32/28 0.87 
[2.39]** 
51/51 
Size 
 
+1 0.32 
[7.87]*** 
90/89 0.35 
[5.89]*** 
38/36 0.21 
[4.73]*** 
68/65 
German Law 
 
+2 (1.26) 
[3.76]*** 
79/75 (0.29) 
[1.33] 
38/36 0.41 
[2.91]*** 
69/67 
French Law  
 
+3 (0.10) 
[0.64] 
70/67 0.44 
[2.32]** 
34/33 0.12 
[0.69] 
65/61 
Industry Dummies +4 Yes 56/54 Yes 27/26 Yes 56/54 
Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Psuedo R-Sq +5 0.32 52/51 0.31 23/22 0.18 48/46 
LogL  -301  -142  -259  
LR (Chi)  0.000  0.000  0.000  
        
 
Appendix 1b: Alternative probit specifications and ATT estimates. 
Time Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 PS1 PS2 PS1 PS2 PS1 PS2 
List Year 
 
0.17 
[1.60] 
(0.06) 
[0.40] 
0.41 
[2.78]*** 
0.09 
[0.30] 
0.58 
[4.55]*** 
(0.05) 
[0.19] 
+1 
 
(0.01) 
[0.16] 
0.07 
[0.63] 
0.19 
[1.47] 
(0.23) 
[0.98] 
0.23 
[2.06]** 
0.33 
[2.22]** 
+2 
 
0.02 
[0.29] 
(0.13) 
[0.94] 
0.07 
[0.64] 
0.07 
[0.63] 
(0.03) 
[0.32] 
0.16 
[1.24] 
+3 
 
0.08 
[0.79] 
(0.02) 
[0.13] 
0.04 
[0.34] 
0.00 
[0.00] 
0.04 
[0.48] 
0.09 
[0.60] 
+4 
 
0.14 
[1.59] 
0.24 
[1.49] 
0.10 
[0.75] 
(0.12) 
[0.59] 
0.04 
[0.41] 
(0.05) 
[0.39] 
+5 
 
0.00 
[0.02] 
0.13 
[0.99] 
0.02 
[0.15] 
0.04 
[0.24] 
(0.20) 
[2.45]** 
0.02 
[0.17] 
       
PS1: Probit (Size & Industry), ATT (Nearest Neighbor). 
PS2: Probit (Size, Growth, Lagged value, legal origin, and industry), ATT (Nearest Neighbor).  
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Appendix 2: Country level variables 
Country English Law French Law German Law Scandinavian 
Law 
Anti-Director 
Rights 
Judicial 
Efficiency  
Argentina 0 1 0 0 4 6.00 
Brazil 0 1 0 0 3 5.75 
Chile 0 1 0 0 5 7.25 
China N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Colombia 0 1 0 0 3 7.25 
Hong Kong 1 0 0 0 5 10.00 
Hungary N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
India 1 0 0 0 5 8.00 
Israel 1 0 0 0 3 10.00 
Korea 0 0 1 0 2 6.00 
Malaysia 1 0 0 0 4 9.00 
Mexico 0 1 0 0 1 6.00 
Peru 0 1 0 0 3 6.75 
Phillipines 0 1 0 0 3 4.75 
Poland N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Singapore 1 0 0 0 4 10.00 
South Africa 1 0 0 0 5 6.00 
Taiwan 0 0 1 0 3 6.75 
Thailand 1 0 0 0 2 3.25 
Turkey 0 1 0 0 2 4.00 
Appendix 3: Correlation Coefficients 
 Tobin’s q Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a Global q Sales Gth Anti-
Director 
Total 
Assets 
VIF 
Tobin’s q 
 
1        - 
Level 1 
 
-0.02** 1       1.08 
Level 2/3 
 
-0.01 -0.03** 1      1.07 
Rule 144a 
 
0.0031 -0.04*** -0.03*** 1     1.05 
Global q 
 
0.31*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 1    1.01 
Sales Gth 0.012 
 
-0.04*** -0.00 -0.02** 0.11*** 1   1.02 
Anti-
Director 
0.20*** 
 
0.12*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.01 -0.09*** 1  1.05 
Total 
Assets 
-0.11*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.00 0.01 -0.06*** 1 1.13 
Appendix 4: Table 5 estimates using Anti-Director Rights and Judicial Efficiency 
 Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 Anti-Director Judicial Eff Anti-Director Judicial Eff Anti-Director Judicial Eff 
 AM BM AM BM AM BM AM BM AM BM AM BM 
List year 
 
-0.04 
[0.42] 
-0.13 
[0.91] 
-0.10 
[0.90] 
0.10 
[0.83] 
0.54 
[1.66]* 
0.31 
[1.19] 
1.05 
[1.97]**
0.25 
[1.22] 
0.35 
[1.19] 
0.36 
[2.53]** 
0.44 
[1.34] 
0.29 
[2.08]** 
1 year after list 
 
-0.02 
[0.27] 
0.03 
[0.19] 
-0.10 
[0.95] 
0.19 
[1.39] 
0.49 
[1.98]**
0.05 
[0.35] 
0.70 
[1.91]* 
0.06 
[0.45] 
-0.05 
[0.20] 
0.41 
[3.09]** 
0.06 
[0.26] 
0.32 
[2.36]** 
2 years after list 
 
-0.02 
[0.18] 
0.03 
[0.23] 
-0.10 
[0.78] 
0.18 
[1.84]* 
0.40 
[1.45] 
-0.17 
[1.79]* 
0.40 
[1.02] 
-0.06 
[0.63] 
-0.07 
[0.35] 
0.27 
[2.71]** 
0.00 
[0.02] 
0.18 
[1.86]* 
3 years after list 
 
-0.14 
[1.22] 
0.25 
[1.08] 
-0.20 
[1.37] 
0.22 
[1.44] 
0.18 
[0.99] 
0.06 
[0.44] 
0.12 
[0.57] 
0.13 
[0.96] 
-0.16 
[1.37] 
0.27 
[2.36]** 
-0.08 
[0.74] 
0.18 
[1.56] 
4 years after list 
 
0.02 
[0.17] 
0.35 
[1.67]* 
0.02 
[0.10] 
0.27 
[1.98]**
0.04 
[0.31] 
0.05 
[0.30] 
0.12 
[0.48] 
0.03 
[0.26] 
0.01 
[0.07] 
0.13 
[1.35] 
0.02 
[0.17] 
0.09 
[0.97] 
5 years after list 
 
0.07 
[0.47] 
0.17 
[1.12] 
0.10 
[0.56] 
0.14 
[1.36] 
0.05 
[0.48] 
0.00 
[0.01] 
0.02 
[0.14] 
0.03 
[0.27] 
-0.14 
[1.30] 
0.16 
[1.48] 
-0.13 
[1.28] 
0.12 
[1.12] 
> 5 years after list 
 
0.06 
[0.39] 
0.59 
[4.14]** 
0.06 
[0.36] 
0.45 
[3.68]**
0.22 
[1.21] 
0.22 
[1.07] 
0.56 
[1.19] 
0.12 
[1.06] 
-0.14 
[1.28] 
0.04 
[0.48] 
-0.12 
[1.07] 
-0.01 
[0.09] 
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Table 1: Sample Description 
Country NCL SIC 6 % Level 1 % Level 
2/3 
% Rule 
144a 
% Total 
CL 
Sample
Argentina 60 7 1.31 0 0.00 11 7.75 5 2.76 16 76 
Brazil 246 29 5.39 26 10.00 25 17.61 3 1.66 54 300 
Chile 113 35 2.48 2 0.77 17 11.97 2 1.10 21 134 
China 89 4 1.95 8 3.08 12 8.45 4 2.21 24 113 
Colombia 27 6 0.59 1 0.38 1 0.70 4 2.21 6 33 
Hong Kong 540 167 11.83 97 37.31 7 4.93 1 0.55 105 645 
Hungary 23 4 0.50 2 0.77 1 0.70 9 4.97 12 35 
India 278 23 6.09 5 1.92 9 6.34 50 27.62 64 342 
Israel 83 16 1.82 1 0.38 8 5.63 0 0.00 9 92 
Korea 636 74 13.94 4 1.54 7 4.93 20 11.05 31 667 
Malaysia 638 153 13.98 12 4.62 0 0.00 0 0.00 12 650 
Mexico 71 14 1.56 18 6.92 25 17.61 11 6.08 54 125 
Peru 45 8 0.99 3 1.15 1 0.70 1 0.55 5 50 
Philippines 110 70 2.41 5 1.92 1 0.70 6 3.31 12 122 
Poland 56 15 1.23 1 0.38 1 0.70 11 6.08 13 69 
Singapore 407 67 8.92 19 7.31 1 0.70 1 0.55 21 428 
South Africa 313 151 6.86 37 14.23 8 5.63 3 1.66 48 361 
Taiwan 404 60 8.85 0 0.00 6 4.23 42 23.20 48 452 
Thailand 296 98 6.49 14 5.38 0 0.00 1 0.55 15 311 
Turkey 128 30 2.81 5 1.92 1 0.70 7 3.87 13 141 
Total 4,563 1,031 100% 260 100% 142 100% 181 100% 583 5,146 
This table outlines the final sample.  To enable matching for financial cross-listed firms, I include a set of non-cross-listed 
financial firms (outlined in column 3).  These firms are not included in the valuation regressions.  All firms are obtained from 
the Worldscope Country Lists.  All information on firms cross-listed in the U.S. are obtained from the Bank of New York, and 
cross-referenced with data provided by Deutsche-Bank, JP Morgan and Citibank.  Rule 144a ADRs trade on Portal; Level 1 
ADRs trade over-the-counter as pink sheet issues, and Level 2/3 trade on the NYSE or NASDAQ.   
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Table 2: Valuation comparison of cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in calendar and event time.   
 Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 CL 
Med 
CL 
Mean 
Mean 
Diff 
PS 
ATT 
CL 
Med 
CL 
Mean 
Mean 
Diff 
PS 
ATT 
CL 
Med 
CL 
Mean 
Mean 
Diff 
PS 
ATT 
Panel A Calendar Time 
1990 1.40 1.49 (0.22) (0.20) 1.42 1.42 (0.29) - - - - - 
1991 1.30 1.40 (0.45) (0.57) 1.57 1.66 (0.19) - 1.17 1.17 (0.68) - 
1992 1.40 1.78 (0.05) (0.06) 1.86 1.81 (0.02) - 1.76 1.82 (0.01) - 
1993 1.67 1.83 (0.06) (0.31) 2.20 2.11 0.22 - 1.71 1.77 (0.12) 0.64 
1994 1.70 1.81 (0.28) (0.26) 1.99 2.05 (0.04) 0.70 2.40 2.61 0.52 0.67 
1995 1.56 1.75 (0.11) 0.20 1.64 1.68 (0.18) 0.03 1.84 1.96 0.10 0.19 
1996 1.43 1.73 (0.10) 0.32 1.63 1.79 (0.04) 0.19 1.51 1.70 (0.13) (0.18) 
1997 1.54 1.79 0.00 0.51 1.70 1.96 0.17 0.32 1.53 1.76 (0.03) 0.16 
1998 1.20 1.42 (0.03) 0.33 1.28 1.44 (0.01) 0.26 1.26 1.50 0.05 0.18 
1999 1.27 1.53 0.00 (0.07) 1.36 1.61 0.08 0.22 1.35 1.60 0.07 0.00 
2000 1.29 1.52 0.01 0.01 1.39 1.70 0.19 0.41 1.31 1.64 0.13 0.10 
2001 1.21 1.38 0.01 (0.05) 1.25 1.42 0.05 0.16 1.21 1.37 0.00 0.19 
2002 1.23 1.41 (0.01) 0.03 1.20 1.38 (0.04) 0.37 1.24 1.43 0.01 0.09 
2003 1.36 1.51 (0.01) (0.02) 1.29 1.51 (0.01) 0.32 1.38 1.54 0.02 0.21 
Panel B Event Time 
 Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 Mean CL Mean 
Diff 
PS ATT Mean CL Mean 
Diff 
PS ATT Mean CL Mean 
Diff 
PS ATT 
-5 2.31 0.65*** - 1.81 0.15 - 1.57 (0.09) - 
-4 1.89 0.23*** - 1.61 (0.05) - 1.66 0.00 - 
-3 1.78 0.12** - 1.61 (0.05) - 1.91 0.25*** - 
-2 1.72 0.06* - 1.73 0.07 - 2.24 0.58*** - 
-1 1.77 0.11** - 1.73 0.07 - 2.10 0.44*** - 
0 1.72 0.06 (0.12) 1.70 0.04 0.32 2.18 0.52*** 0.42** 
1 1.63 (0.03) (0.02) 1.60 (0.06) 0.15 1.96 0.30*** 0.22 
2 1.55 (0.11) 0.07 1.57 (0.09) 0.12 1.72 0.06 0.21 
3 1.61 (0.05) 0.14 1.62 (0.04) 0.18 1.64 (0.02) 0.29 
4 1.60 (0.06) (0.04) 1.56 (0.10) 0.06 1.50 (0.16) (0.03) 
5 1.47 (0.19) 0.14 1.48 (0.18) 0.15 1.44 (0.22) (0.07) 
 Event Time (Before-After Value) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Before 1.87 1.59 1.66 1.45 1.89 1.43 
After 1.56 1.33 1.59 1.36 1.62 1.34 
Difference (0.31)*** (0.26)*** (0.07) (0.09) (0.27)*** (0.09) 
  
This table compares the mean performance of cross-listed (Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a) to non-cross-listed firms in each 
year from 1990 to 2003, and in event time (5 years pre-listing to 5 years post-listing).  Firm value is proxied using Tobin’s q, 
where.  For each subset of cross-listed firms, I also outline the average effect of the treatment on the treated 
[ ] using propensity score matching [PS ATT], in calendar and event time.  In the Appendix I outline 
exactly how I calculate the ATT.  For cross-listed firms, I also outline their median value.  ***, **, * Represents significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
CL NCLE(q q |D 1, X)− =
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Table 3: Regression estimates of the impact of cross-listing on firm value. 
 Level 1 Level 2/3 
 
Rule 144a 
 POLS FE TE POLS FE TE POLS FE TE 
Level 1 
 
0.04 
[0.55] 
-0.07 
[1.55] 
0.07 
[0.85] 
      
Level 2/3 
 
   0.24 
[2.89]***
0.16 
[2.07]** 
0.15 
[1.57] 
   
Rule 144a 
 
      0.03 
[0.43] 
0.08 
[1.23] 
0.04 
[0.57] 
Global q 
 
1.13 
[8.05]***
0.60 
[7.56]*** 
1.10 
[7.75]***
1.12 
[8.11]***
0.60 
[7.58]*** 
1.05 
[7.55]***
1.13 
[8.07]*** 
0.60 
[7.62]*** 
1.12 
[7.96]***
Sales Growth 
 
0.54 
[4.83]***
0.45 
[7.21]*** 
0.44 
[3.90]***
0.53 
[4.74]***
0.45 
[7.29]*** 
0.50 
[4.43]***
0.53 
[4.80]*** 
0.45 
[7.26]*** 
0.42 
[3.70]***
Total Assets 
 
-0.10 
[5.95]***
-0.26 
[14.40]*** 
 -0.10 
[6.25]***
-0.26 
[14.64]***
 -0.10 
[5.75]*** 
-0.26 
[14.54]***
 
Anti-Director 
 
0.12 
[8.81]***
  0.12 
[9.21]***
  0.12 
[9.03]*** 
  
Lambda ( )λ  
 
- - 0.01 
[1.17] 
- - 0.04 
[5.49]***
- - 0.07 
[5.62]***
Time Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
# Obs 7,001 7,426 7,426 7,001 7,426 7,426 7,001 7,426 7,426 
2R  0.14 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.10 
Pr F>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pr F(Mundlak)>  0.000 - - 0.000 - - 0.000 - - 
          
This table presents coefficient estimates from panel regressions.  I present three sets of panel data estimates; pooled ordinary least 
squares with Mundlak (1978) corrections [POLS], firm-fixed effects [FE], and Treatment Effects [TE].  The Treatment Effects 
regressions are estimated as three separate regressions based upon the different ADR sub-sample of firms.  For each ADR level, 
we estimate a first-stage probit model where the decision to list is determined in terms of size (Log (Total Assets)), and Legal 
Origin (French, German).  To satisfy the exclusion restrictions, these variables are excluded in the second-stage regressions.  The 
first stage probit estimates are available from the author upon request.  Firm value is proxied using Tobin’s q.  The independent 
variables are defined in the text.  A full set of year specific dummy variables are reported (except in the case of the pooled ordinary 
least squares estimates) but not reported.  I report t-statistics in parentheses.  The pooled ordinary least squares t-statistics are 
calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level.  # Obs is the number of observations and is the coefficient of 
determination (I report the overall for the firm-fixed effect estimates).  I report two F-Stats: (joint significance of all 
RHS variables) and which tests the joint significance of the included (unreported) Mundlak (1978) time-averaged 
correction terms.  ***, **, * Represents significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.           
2R
2R Pr F>
Pr F(Mundlak)>
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Table 4: Regression estimates based on country legal characteristics.   
 Anti-Director Rights 
Index 
Judicial Efficiency English Common Law All 
 Above 
Median 
Below  
Median 
Above 
Median 
Below  
Median 
Common 
Law 
Civil Law  
Level 1 
 
-0.02 
[0.20] 
0.25 
[1.78]* 
-0.03 
[0.24] 
0.26 
[3.01]*** 
0.04 
[0.39] 
0.08 
[0.61] 
0.28 
[2.62]*** 
Level 2/3 
 
0.20 
[1.67]* 
0.16 
[1.39] 
0.39 
[2.15]** 
0.12 
[1.25] 
0.51 
[3.04]*** 
0.15 
[1.74]* 
 
Rule 144a 
 
-0.08 
[0.70] 
0.24 
[3.09]*** 
-0.03 
[0.25] 
0.18 
[2.29]** 
-0.10 
[0.84] 
0.25 
[3.42]*** 
-0.03 
[0.40] 
Global q 
 
0.79 
[4.10]*** 
1.38 
[7.49]*** 
0.91 
[4.66]*** 
1.26 
[6.82]*** 
0.84 
[4.77]*** 
1.36 
[6.99]*** 
1.13 
[8.05]*** 
Sales Growth 
 
0.11 
[0.75] 
0.87 
[5.87]*** 
0.11 
[0.66] 
0.76 
[5.40]*** 
0.31 
[1.97]** 
0.73 
[5.03]*** 
0.44 
[3.74]*** 
Total Assets 
 
-0.10 
[3.62]*** 
-0.12 
[6.57]*** 
-0.10 
[3.64]*** 
-0.11 
[5.93]*** 
-0.10 
[3.54]*** 
-0.12 
[6.38]*** 
-0.11 
[6.35]*** 
Level 1 * Sales Growth * Anti 
 
      -0.21 
[2.83]*** 
Rule 144a * Sales Growth * Anti 
 
      0.16 
[1.30] 
Time Dummies No No No No No No No 
# Obs 3,863 3,563 3,259 4,167 3,835 3,591 7,027 
2R  0.12 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.11 
Pr F>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pr F(Mundlak)>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
This table presents coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the firm) based on legal characteristics.  These characteristics are Anti-Director Rights Index, Judicial Efficiency, and 
Legal Origin (English common law or not).  All three variables are taken from and defined in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).  Firm value is proxied using Tobin’s q.  The independent variables are defined in the text.  .  # Obs 
is the number of observations and is the coefficient of determination (I report the overall for the firm-fixed effect 
estimates).  I report two F-Stats: (joint significance of all RHS variables) and which tests the joint 
significance of the included (unreported) Mundlak (1978) time-averaged correction terms.  ***, **, * Represents significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.           
2R 2R
Pr F> Pr F(Mundlak)>
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
Table 5: Cross-listing and the evolution of Tobin’s q.     
 Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a 
 All Com Civil All Com Civil All Com Civil 
List year 
 
0.03 
[0.37] 
-0.02 
[0.18] 
-0.20 
[2.58]***
0.38 
[1.83]* 
0.66 
[1.73]* 
0.33 
[1.43] 
0.34 
[2.33]** 
0.60 
[1.46] 
-0.20 
[2.58]***
1 year after list 
 
0.08 
[0.99] 
0.06 
[0.55] 
-0.18 
[2.31]** 
0.21 
[1.42] 
0.49 
[1.46] 
0.20 
[1.40] 
0.23 
[1.83]* 
-0.07 
[0.32] 
-0.18 
[2.31]** 
2 years after list 
 
0.07 
[0.73] 
0.01 
[0.07] 
-0.02 
[0.21] 
0.02 
[0.14] 
0.35 
[1.37] 
0.06 
[0.42] 
0.12 
[1.31] 
-0.16 
[0.93] 
-0.02 
[0.21] 
3 years after list 
 
0.03 
[0.30] 
-0.06 
[0.47] 
0.05 
[0.38] 
0.10 
[0.86] 
0.41 
[1.82]* 
0.10 
[0.85] 
0.08 
[0.93] 
-0.25 
[1.94]* 
0.05 
[0.38] 
4 years after list 
 
0.17 
[1.50] 
0.16 
[1.07] 
0.04 
[0.22] 
0.06 
[0.56] 
0.56 
[1.61] 
-0.02 
[0.23] 
0.06 
[0.80] 
-0.03 
[0.17] 
0.04 
[0.22] 
5 years after list 
 
0.13 
[1.16] 
0.08 
[0.57] 
0.09 
[0.52] 
0.02 
[0.23] 
0.52 
[4.98]***
-0.02 
[0.23] 
0.01 
[0.05] 
-0.24 
[2.52]** 
0.09 
[0.52] 
> 5 years after list 
 
0.22 
[1.69]* 
0.11 
[0.67] 
0.32 
[1.60] 
0.21 
[1.27] 
1.09 
[4.62]***
0.04 
[0.41] 
-0.06 
[0.87] 
-0.17 
[1.39] 
0.32 
[1.60] 
Global q 
 
1.16 
[8.24]*** 
0.86 
[4.79]*** 
1.39 
[6.93]***
1.16 
[8.28]***
0.82 
[4.75]***
1.38 
[6.95]***
1.15 
[8.25]*** 
0.85 
[4.72]***
1.39 
[6.93]***
Sales growth 
 
0.41 
[3.75]*** 
0.33 
[2.15]** 
0.73 
[5.02]***
0.39 
[3.52]***
0.31 
[1.97]** 
0.71 
[4.83]***
0.39 
[3.52]*** 
0.30 
[1.94]* 
0.73 
[5.02]***
Total Assets 
 
-0.10 
[6.53]*** 
-0.09 
[3.36]*** 
-0.10 
[5.33]***
-0.10 
[6.50]***
-0.10 
[3.62]***
-0.10 
[5.46]***
-0.10 
[6.22]*** 
-0.08 
[3.12]***
-0.09 
[5.33]***
Time Dummies No No No No No No No No No 
# Obs 7,452 3,853 3,599 7,452 3,853 3,599 7,452 3,853 3,599 
2R  0.11 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.15 
Pr F>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pr F(Mundlak)>  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          
This table presents coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares regressions (with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the firm) for the full sample and by legal origin.  ‘Com’ is English common law.  Civil is civil law.  Firm value is proxied 
using Tobin’s q.  The independent variables are defined in the text.  The single year cross-listing dummies equal one in the 
referred year, and zero otherwise.  The ‘> 5 years after listing’ dummy equals one after the fifth year of listing and zero before. .  
# Obs is the number of observations and is the coefficient of determination (I report the overall for the firm-fixed effect 
estimates).  I report two F-Stats: (joint significance of all RHS variables) and which tests the joint 
significance of the included (unreported) Mundlak (1978) time-averaged correction terms.  ***, **, * Represents significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2R 2R
Pr F> Pr F(Mundlak)>
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Figure 1 
Value of Level 1 firms in calendar and event time 
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Figure 2 
Value of Level 2/3 firms in calendar and event time 
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Figure 3 
Value of Rule 144a firms in calendar and event time 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 25
